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breach of implied warranty claim. It
noted that under Illinois law, failure to
attach a copy of the contract from
which the warranty arises, or an affida-
vit stating that a copy is unobtainable,
warrants dismissal of the argument.
Thus, the court concluded that although
a written contract between the parties
could have formed the basis of a war-
ranty, Popp's failure to attach the ap-
propriate documents justified dismissal
of this claim.
Court Finds No Antitrust Violation
The court also rejected Popp's claim
that Cash Station's merger with Money
Network violated the Illinois antitrust
laws. The court emphasized that a
monopoly is not per se illegal and that
only the use of anti-competitive means
to achieve or maintain a monopoly
violates the antitrust laws. Thus, Popp
could recover only if she established
that Cash Station engaged in some type
of prohibited anti-competitive conduct,
which consequently caused economic
injury. The court found that Popp
failed to allege that Cash Station pos-
sessed monopoly power to control prices
or to exclude competition. Instead,
Popp only alleged that, but for the
merger, there would be competition
between providers of ATM services
which could induce one or more com-
petitors to provide ATM security sys-
tems. The court concluded that Popp's
complaint lacked specific facts required
for a claim under the Illinois antitrust
laws. Furthermore, the court stated
that since Popp's fear of criminal at-
tack was not an economic injury, an
antitrust claim is inapplicable. o*
- Bina Sanghavi
Texas Law Permits Fraud
ClaimsAgainst Corporate
Agents as Individuals
In Walker v. F.D.LC., 970 F.2d 114
(5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that under Texas law,
corporate officers are individually li-
able for their own deceptive and fraudu-
lent representations, even if they acted
within the scope of corporate author-
ity. Furthermore, the court held that
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practice-
Consumer Protection Act, Tex. Bus. &
Comm. Code Ann. sec. 17.41 et seq.
(Vernon 1987), applies to loans if used
to purchase specific items.
The Quid Pro Quo
In October 1982, real estate devel-
opers Ted Walker and James Brunson
(the "Developers") contacted defen-
dant Ron Bearden, a Mainland Savings
Association ("Mainland") officer and
director. The Developers offered to
sell the International Energy Center
building (the "IEC Building") to Main-
land. Months of negotiations ensued,
during which the parties discussed a
$21 million project development loan
to the Developers. The Developers
contended that Mainland offered the
loan, along with $1 million, in exchange
for the IEC Building. However, the
parties never executed a written loan
agreement.
On August 8, 1983, the Developers
exchanged the IEC Building and sur-
rounding property with Mainland for
$1 million in cash and the alleged $21
million loan. Mainland's attorney,
drafted the exchange agreement.
Mainland, however, never issued
the loan to the Developers. Conse-
quently, they sued Mainland and two of
its directors, Bearden and Hill, in Texas
state court, claiming that Mainland
failed to provide a $21 million dollar
loan in return for the sale of the IEC
Building.
A legal morass ensued involving
two connected suits and Mainland's
insolvency. Mainland's insolvency
brought in federal agencies as parties
and the consolidated suits went back
and forth between state and federal
court. At the point of this appeal, the
only remaining defendants were
Bearden and Hill as individuals. A
Texas state court had entered a judg-
ment in favor of Bearden and Hill
stating that they could not be person-
ally liable for the alleged acts unless
they performed or made fraudulent
representations outside the scope of
their employment. The Developers
appealed, and a federal district court
affirmed the decision. The Developers
appealed a second time.
Agents May be Personally Liable
On appeal, the developers contended
that Bearden and Hill reneged on their
promise of a $21 million loan. The
Developers charged that Bearden and
Hill were liable for fraud, conspiracy,
and on an estoppel theory. Addition-
ally, the Developers claimed that
Bearden and Hill violated the Decep-
tive Trade Practice-Consumer Protec-
tion Act (the "Act"). In response,
Bearden and Hill asserted that corpo-
rate agents cannot be personally liable
for acts committed within the scope of
employment, and therefore, the court
should dismiss the suit.
The Fifth Circuit rejected Bearden
and Hill's argument. Instead, it found
that under Texas law, corporate offic-
ers could be held individually liable for
deception and fraud, even if it is com-
mitted within the scope of their corpo-
rate authority. The court based its
decision on a Texas Supreme Court
ruling, which held that under the Act,
a corporate agent may be held person-
ally liable for oral or written promises
made by them, even if made within the
scope of employment. The appellate
court reversed, and a jury is set to
decide this claim at trial.
Fraud Claim Against Bearden
Reversed
The appellate court next addressed
the claim of fraud against Bearden. It
stated that, although Bearden submit-
ted evidence that he did not make
material misrepresentations, the De-
velopers rebutted this evidence with
sufficient proof to create an issue of
material fact as to fraud. Consequently,
the court held that there was sufficient
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evidence to allow a claim of fraud
against Bearden go before a jury.
Among the evidence that the Devel-
opers produced were sworn affidavits
stating that they would receive the
multi-million dollar loan along with
the $1 million in exchange for the IEC
Building. The affidavits also stated
that at the closing, Bearden failed to
disclose that Mainland would not pro-
vide the loan. The Developers also
submitted a letter from Walker to Main-
land, in which Walker clarified expec-
tations the parties expected to see in
writing at the closing.
Judgment Affirmed for Remaining
Claims
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit found
that the Developers' evidence did not
create an issue of material fact for the
fraud claim against Hill. The court
stated that their evidence of Hill's sur-
prise of the loan problem and Hill's
response that he would take care of the
situation did not support the allegation
that he committed fraud. Similarly,
the appellate court did not find suffi-
cient evidence regarding the conspiracy
claims against both defendants to allow
a jury decide the issue.
The court also affirmed the district
court's judgment in favor of Bearden
and Hill on claims under the Act. The
appellate court stated that an action
under the Act required the Developers
to establish that they were consumers
seeking or acquiring "by purchase or
lease, any goods or services." Further-
more, where the borrower fails to al-
lege a complaint regarding the items he
intended to acquire with the loan, the
Texas courts have ruled the complain-
ant is not a consumer and therefore has
no right to sue under the Act. Thus,
since the Developers failed to allege a
complaint regarding the specific project
they intended to fund with the loan,
they were not consumers within the
scope of the Act. Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit affirned the dismissal of
this claim. 40
- Christine Cody
General Business Law
Regulates Insurance
Company's DeceptiveActs
In Riordan v. Nationwide Mutual
Fire Insurance, 977 F.2d 47 (2nd Cir.
1992), the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that a
New York law prohibiting deceptive
practices in business conduct applied to
insurance companies. Additionally,
the court stated that in appropriate
cases, the insured can recover attorney
fees.
Burned in More than One Way
In 1988, John Riordan and his wife,
Jane Fox, (the "Riordans") purchased a
homeowner's insurance policy from
Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance
("Nationwide") for their home in
Ossining, New York. The policy guar-
anteed the replacement cost of the build-
ing and its contents in the event of loss.
On July 17, 1989, a fire occurred at the
home, destroying most of the house
and the personal property it contained.
The Riordans notified Nationwide
and hired Steven Seltzer, an insurance
adjuster, to assist them with theirclaim.
John Hahn, Nationwide's claims ad-
juster, visited the site two days after the
fire and obtained a contractor's esti-
mate for the repair cost of the damage.
The Riordans submitted an inventory
list to Hahn. Hahn, however, failed to
authorize the start of any repairs.
Eventually, the Riordans had the
damaged effects cleaned and restored.
Nationwide never sent a representative
to evaluate the damages to those items,
despite persistent requests. The Riordans
submitted a timely Proof of Loss form,
listing only the irreparably damaged
items.
Nationwide advanced $25,000 to
the Riordans on the building portion of
the claim. Nationwide stipulated, how-
ever, that the Riordans could not use
the money for housing repairs without
the prior approval of Citibank, the
mortgagee of the property. Because
Citibank would not release the money
until the building portion of the claim
was fully settled, the Riordan's could
not live in the unrepaired structure.
Although the parties attempted to
settle, Nationwide refused to discharge
the building part of the claim unless the
Riordans accepted the offer for the
contents portion as well. Since
Nationwide's offer for the contents
was approximately $21,000 and the
Riordan's sought more than $160,000,
the Riordans rejected the all-or-noth-
ing settlement offer.
Suit For Contract Breach and
Deceptive Acts
The Riordans filed suit against Na-
tionwide in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New
York. They alleged that Nationwide
violated § 349 of New York's
McKinney's General Business Law (the
"Law") by breaching their insurance
contract and committing deceptive acts
and practices in the claims settlement
process. The Riordans sought compen-
satory and punitive damages as well as
attorney fees. The district court en-
tered a judgment in favor of the
Riordans on their breach of contract
claim.
At trial on the deceptive acts issue,
the jury returned a verdict in favor of
the Riordans, awarding sums for repair
of the house, damage to the contents,
and living expenses. In addition, the
jury awarded $1,000 for the deceptive
acts and practices violations and
$150,000 in punitive damages. The
court also awarded attorney fees. Na-
tionwide appealed the judgment to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
General Business Law Binds
Insurance Companies
Nationwide first asserted that New
York's Law did not apply to insurance
companies since various state statutes
already extensively regulated unfair
and deceptive practices within the in-
dustry. The Second Circuit rejected
Nationwide's reasoning because it
found that § 349 clearly stated it ap-
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